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We consider the invertibility (injectivity) of a nonparametric nonseparable demand
system. Invertibility of demand is important in several contexts, including identica-
tion of demand, estimation of demand, testing of revealed preference, and economic
theory exploiting existence of an inverse demand function or (in an exchange economy)
uniqueness of Walrasian equilibrium prices. We introduce the notion of connected
substitutesand show that this structure is su¢ cient for invertibility. The connected
substitutes conditions require weak substitution between all goods and su¢ cient strict
substitution to necessitate treating them in a single demand system. The connected
substitutes conditions have transparent economic interpretation, are easily checked,
and are satised in many standard models. They need only hold under some trans-
formation of demand and can accommodate many models in which goods are comple-
ments. They allow one to show invertibility without strict gross substitutes, functional
form restrictions, smoothness assumptions, or strong domain restrictions. When the
restriction to weak substitutes is maintained, our su¢ cient conditions are also nearly
necessaryfor even local invertibility.
Keywords: univalence, injectivity, weak substitutes, complements
This paper combines and expands on selected material rst explored in Gandhi (2008) and Berry and
Haile (2009). We have benetted from helpful comments from Jean-Marc Robin, Don Brown, the referees,
and participants in seminars at LSE, UCL, Wisconsin, Yale, the 2011 UCL workshop on Consumer Behavior
and Welfare Measurement, and the 2011 Econometrics of Demand conference at MIT. Adam Kapor
provided capable research assistance. Financial support from the National Science Foundation is gratefully
acknowledged.
1 Introduction
We consider the invertibility (injectivity) of a nonparametric nonseparable demand system.
Invertibility of demand is important in several theoretical and applied contexts, including
identication of demand, estimation of demand systems, testing of revealed preference, and
economic theory exploiting existence of an inverse demand function or (in an exchange
economy) uniqueness of Walrasian equilibrium prices. We introduce the notion of connected
substitutesand show that this structure is su¢ cient for invertibility.
We consider a general setting in which demand for goods 1; : : : ; J is characterized by
 (x) = (1 (x) ; : : : ; J (x)) : X  RJ ! RJ (1)
where x = (x1; : : : ; xJ) is a vector of demand shifters. All other arguments of the demand
system are held xed. This setup nests many special cases of interest. Points  (x) might
represent vectors of market shares, quantities demanded, choice probabilities, or expenditure
shares. The demand shifters x might be prices, unobserved characteristics of the goods, or
latent preference shocks. Several examples in section 2 illustrate.
The connected substitutes structure involves two conditions. First, goods must be weak
substitutesin the sense that, all else equal, an increase in xj (e.g., fall in js price) weakly
lowers demand for all other goods. Second, we require connected strict substitution
roughly, su¢ cient strict substitution between goods to require treating them in one demand
system. These conditions have transparent economic interpretation and are easily conrmed
in many standard models. They need only hold under some transformation of the demand
system and can accommodate many settings with complementary goods.
The connected substitutes conditions allow us to show invertibility without the functional
form restrictions, smoothness assumptions, or strong domain restrictions relied on previously.
We also provide a partial necessity result by considering the special case of di¤erentiable
demand. There we show that when the weak substitutes condition is maintained, connected
strict substitution is necessary for nonsingularity of the Jacobian matrix. Thus, given weak
1
substitutes, connected substitutes is su¢ cient for global invertibility and nearly necessary
for even local invertibility. A corollary to our two theorems is a new global inverse function
theorem allowing arbitrary open domain.






The interpretation will vary with the application. When demand is expressed in shares (e.g.,
choice probabilities or market shares), good 0might be a realgood e.g., a numeraire good,
an outside good,or a good relative to which utilities are normalized. The identity (2) will
then follow from the fact that shares sum to one. In other applications, good 0 will be a
purely articial notion introduced only as a technical device (see the examples below). This
can be useful even when an outside good is also modeled (see Appendix C).
It is clear from (2) that (1) characterizes the full demand system even when good 0 is
a real good. Nonetheless, explicitly accounting for the demand for good 0 in this case
simplies imposition of the connected substitutes structure on all goods. When good 0 is an
articial good, including it in the connected substitutes conditions proves useful as well. As
will be clear below, it strengthens the weak substitutes requirement in a natural way while
weakening the requirement of connected strict substitution.
Also important to our approach is a potential distinction between the set X and the
subset of this domain on which injectivity of  is in question. A demand system generally
will not be injective at points mapping to zero demand for some good j. For example, raising
good js price (lowering xj) at such a point typically will not change any goods demand. So
when considering conditions ensuring injectivity, it is natural to restrict attention to the set
~X = fx 2 X : j (x) > 0 8j > 0g
or even to a strict subset of ~X e.g., considering only values present in a given data set, or
only positive prices even though  is dened on all of RJ (e.g., multinomial logit or probit).
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Allowing such possibilities, we consider injectivity of  on any set
X   X
(typically X   ~X ). Rather than starting from the restriction of  to X , however, it proves
helpful to allow X  6= X . For example, one can impose useful regularity conditions on X
with little or no loss (we will assume it is a Cartesian product). In contrast, assumptions
on the shape or topological properties of X  implicitly restrict either the function  or the
subset of ~X on which injectivity can be demonstrated. Avoiding such restrictions is one
signicant way in which we break from the prior literature.
There is a large literature on the injectivity of real functions, most of it developing
conditions ensuring that a locally invertible function is globally invertible. This literature
goes back at least to Hadamard (1906a,b). Although we cannot attempt a full review here,
the monograph of Parthasarathy (1983) provides an extensive treatment, and references to
more recent work can be found in, e.g., Parthasarathy and Ravindran (2003) and Gowda
and Ravindran (2000). Local invertibility is itself an open question in many important
demand models, where useful conditions like local strict gross substitutes or local strict
diagonal dominance fail because each good substitutes only with nearby goods in the
product space (several examples below illustrate). Even when local invertibility is given,
su¢ cient conditions for global invertibility in this literature have proven either inadequate
for our purpose (ruling out important models of demand) or problematic in the sense that
transparent economic assumptions delivering these conditions have been overly restrictive or
even di¢ cult to identify.
A central result in this literature is the global univalencetheorem of Gale and Nikaido
(1965). Gale and Nikaido considered a di¤erentiable real function  with nonsingular
Jacobian on X  = X .1 They showed that  is globally injective if X  is a rectangle (a
product of intervals) and the Jacobian is everywhere a P -matrix (all principal minors are
1Gale and Nikaido (1965) make no distinction between X and X . When these di¤er, Gale and Nikaido
implicitly focus on the restriction of  to X .
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strictly positive). While this result is often relied on to ensure invertibility of demand, its
requirements are often problematic. Di¤erentiability is essential, but fails in some important
models. Examples include those with demand dened on a discrete domain (e.g., a grid
of prices), random utility models with discrete distributions, or nite mixtures of vertical
models. Given di¤erentiability, the P -matrix condition can be di¢ cult to interpret, verify,
or to derive from widely applicable primitive conditions (see the examples below). Finally,
the premise of nonsingular Jacobian on rectangular X  is often an signicant limitation. If
 is di¤erentiable and j (x) = 0, then typically
@j(x)
@xk
= 0 8k, yielding a singular Jacobian
at x =2 ~X . However, ~X is often not a rectangle. For example, in a market with vertically
di¤erentiated goods (e.g., Mussa and Rosen (1978)), a lower quality good has no demand
unless its price is strictly below that of all higher quality goods. So if  x is the price vector,
~X generally will not be a rectangle. Other examples include models of spatial di¤erentiation
(e.g., Salop (1979)), linear demand models, the pure characteristicsmodel of Berry and
Pakes (2007), and the Lancasterian model in Appendix C. When ~X is not a rectangle, the
Gale-Nikaido result can demonstrate invertibility only on a rectangular strict subset of ~X .
The literature on global invertibility has not been focused on invertibility of demand, and
we are unaware of any result that avoids the broad limitations of the Gale-Nikaido result
when applied to demand systems. All require some combination of smoothness conditions,
restrictions on the domain of interest, and restrictions on the function (or its Jacobian) that
are violated by important examples and/or are di¢ cult to motivate with natural economic
assumptions.2 The connected substitutes conditions avoid these limitations. They have
clear interpretation and are easily checked based on qualitative features of the demand
system. They hold in wide range of models studied in practice and imply injectivity without
2A few results, starting with Mas-Colell (1979), use additional smoothness conditions to allow the domain
to be any full dimension compact convex polyhedron. However, the natural domain of interest ~X can be
open, unbounded, and/or nonconvex. Examples include standard models of vertical or horizontal di¤erenti-
ation or the pure characteristics modelof Berry and Pakes (2007). And while the boundaries of ~X (if
they exist) are often planes when utilities are linear in x, this is not a general feature. A less cited result in
Gale and Nikaido (1965) allows arbitrary convex domain but strengthens the Jacobian condition to require
positive quasidenitess. Positive quasideniteness (even weak quasideniteness, explored in extensions) is
violated on ~X in prominent demand models, including that of Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995).
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any smoothness requirement or restriction on the set X .
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides several examples that motivate our
interest, tie our general formulation to more familiar special cases, and provide connections
to related work. We complete the setup in section 3 and present the connected substitutes
conditions in section 4. We give our main result in section 5. Section 6 presents a second
theorem that underlies our partial exploration of necessity, enables us to provide tight links
to the classic results of Hadamard and of Gale and Nikaido, and has additional implications
of importance to the econometrics of di¤erentiated products markets.
2 Examples
Estimation of Discrete Choice Demand Models. A large empirical literature uses ran-
dom utility discrete choice models to study demand for di¤erentiated products, building on
pioneering work of McFadden (1974, 1981), Bresnahan (1981, 1987) and others. Conditional
indirect utilities are normalized relative to that of good 0, often an outside good representing
purchase of goods not explicitly under study. Much of the recent literature follows Berry
(1994) in modeling price endogeneity through a vector of product-specic unobservables x,
with each xj shifting tastes for good j monotonically. Holding observables xed, (x) gives
the vector of choice probabilities (or market shares). Because each j is a nonlinear function
of the entire vector of unobservables x, invertibility is nontrivial. However, it is essential
to standard estimation approaches, including those of Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995),
Berry and Pakes (2007), and Dube, Fox, and Su (2012).3 Berry (1994) provided su¢ cient
conditions for invertibility that include linearity of utilities, di¤erentiability of j (x), and
strict gross substitutes.4 We relax all three conditions, opening the possibility of developing
3The Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) estimation algorithm also exploits the fact that, in the models
they consider,  is surjective at all parameter values. Given injectivity, this ensures that even at wrong (i.e.,
trial) parameter values, the observed choice probabilities can be inverted. This property is not necessary for
all estimation methods or for other purposes motivating interest in the inverse. However, Gandhi (2010)
provides su¢ cient conditions for a nonparametric model and also discusses a solution algorithm.
4Although Berry (1994) assumes strict gross substitutes, his proof only requires that each inside good
strictly substitute to the outside good. Hotz and Miller (1993) provide an invertibility theorem for a similar
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estimators based on inverse demand functions for new extensions of the standard models,
including semiparametric or nonparametric models (e.g., Gandhi and Nevo (2011), Souza-
Rodrigues (2011)).
Nonparametric Identication of Demand. Separate from practical estimation issues,
there has been growing interest in the question of whether demand models in the spirit of
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) are identied without the strong functional form and
distributional assumptions typically used in applications. Berry and Haile (2009b, 2010)
have recently provided a¢ rmative answers for nonparametric models in which x is a vector
of unobservables reecting latent tastes in a market and/or unobserved characteristics of the
goods in a market. Conditioning on all observables, one obtains choice probabilities of the
form (1). The invertibility result below provides an essential lemma for Berry and Hailes
identication results, many of which extend immediately to any demand system satisfying
the connected substitutes conditions.
Inverting for Preference Shocks in Continuous Demand Systems. Beckert and
Blundell (2008) recently considered a model in which utility from a bundle of consumption
quantities q = (q0; : : : ; qJ) is given by a strictly increasing C2 function u (q; x), with x 2 RJ
denoting latent demand shocks. The price of good 0 is normalized to 1. Given total expen-
diture m and prices p = (p1; : : : ; pJ) for the remaining goods, quantities demanded are given
by qj = hj (p;m; x) j = 1; : : : ; J , with q0 = m  
P
j>0 pjqj. Beckert and Blundell (2008)
consider invertibility of this demand system in the latent vector x, pointing out that this is
a necessary step toward identication of demand or testing of stochastic revealed preference
restrictions (e.g., Block and Marschak (1960), McFadden and Richter (1971, 1990), Falmagne
(1978), McFadden (2004)). They provide several invertibility results. One requires mar-
ginal rates of substitution between good 0 and goods j > 0 to be multiplicatively separable
in x, with an invertible matrix of coe¢ cients. Alternatively, they provide conditions (on
class of models, although they provide a complete proof only for local, not global, invertibility. Berry and
Pakes (2007) state an invertibility result for a discrete choice model relaxing some assumptions in Berry
(1994), while still assuming the linearity of utility in xj . Their proof is incomplete, although adding the
second of our two connected substitutes conditions would correct this deciency.
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functional form and/or derivative matrices of marginal rates of substitution) implying the
Gale-Nikaido Jacobian requirement. We provide an alternative to such restrictions.
One way to translate their model to ours is through expenditure shares. To do this, x
p and m, let j (x) = pjh (p;m; x) =m for j > 0. Expenditure shares sum to one, implying
the identity (2). Other transformations are also possible (see Example 1 below). And
although Beckert and Blundell represent all goods in the economy by j = 0; 1; : : : ; J , a
common alternative is to consider demand for a more limited set of goods for example,
those in a particular product category. In that case, there will no longer be a good whose
demand is determined from the othersthrough the budget constraint, and it will be natural
to have a demand shock xj for every good j. This situation is also easily accommodated.
Holding prices and all other demand shifters xed, let j (x) now give the quantity of good
j demanded for j = 1; : : : ; J . To complete the mapping to our model, let (2) dene the
object 0 (x). A hint at the role this articial good 0 plays below can be seen by observing
that a rise in 0 (x) represents a fall in the demand for goods j > 0 as a whole.
Existence of Inverse Demand, Uniqueness of Walrasian Equilibrium. Let  xj be
the price of good j. Conditional on all other demand shifters, let j (x) give the quantity
demanded of good j. A need for invertible demand arises in several contexts. In an ex-
change economy, invertibility of aggregate Walrasian demand is equivalent to uniqueness of
Walrasian equilibrium prices. Our connected substitutes assumptions relax the strict gross
substitutes property that is a standard su¢ cient condition for uniqueness. In a partial equi-
librium setting, invertibility of aggregate Marshallian demand is required for competition in
quantities to be well dened. The result of Gale and Nikaido (1965) has often been employed
to show uniqueness. Cheng (1985) provided economically interpretable su¢ cient conditions,
showing that the Gale and Nikaido (1965) Jacobian condition holds under the dominant di-
agonal condition of McKenzie (1960) and a restriction to strict gross substitutes. In addition
to the limitations of requiring di¤erentiability and, especially, a rectangular domain, the re-
quirement of strict gross substitutes (here and in several other results cited above) rules out
many standard models of di¤erentiated products, where substitution is only local, i.e.,
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between goods that are adjacent in the product space (see, e.g., Figure 1 and Appendix A
below). Our invertibility result avoids these limitations. Here we would again use the
identity (2) to introduce an articial good 0 as a technical device.
3 Model
Let J = f0; 1; : : : ; Jg. Recall that x 2 X  RJ is a vector of demand shifters and that all
other determinants of demand are held xed.5 Given the identity (2), the demand system
can be characterized by  = (1; : : : ; J) : X ! RJ . Although we refer to  as demand
(and to j (x) as demand for good j),  may be any transformation of the demand system,
e.g.,  (x) = g  f (x) where f (x) gives quantities demanded and g : f (X ) ! RJ . In this
case  is injective only if f is. Our connected substitutes assumptions on  are postponed
to the following section; however, one should think of xj as a monotonic shifter of demand
for good j. In the examples above, xj is either (minus) the price of good j, the unobserved
quality of good j, or a shock to taste for good j. In all of these examples, monotonicity is a
standard property. Recall that we seek injectivity of  on X   X .
Assumption 1. X is a Cartesian product.
This assumption can be relaxed (see Berry, Gandhi, and Haile (2011) for details) but
appears to be innocuous in most applications. We contrast this with Gale and Nikaidos
assumption that X  is a rectangle. There is a supercial similarity, since a rectangle is a
special case of a Cartesian product. But a fundamental distinction is that we place no
restriction on the set X  (see the discussion in the introduction). Further, Assumption 1
plays the role of a regularity condition here, whereas rectangularity of X  is integral to the
proof of Gale and Nikaidos result (see also Moré and Rheinboldt (1973)) and limits its
applicability.
5When good 0 is an real good relative to which prices or utilities are normalized, this includes all char-
acteristics of this good. For example, we do not rule out the possibility that good 0 has a price x0, but are
holding it xed (e.g., at 1).
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4 Connected Substitutes
Our main requirement for invertibility is a pair of conditions characterizing connected sub-
stitutes. The rst is that the goods are weak substitutes in x in the sense that when xj
increases (e.g., js price falls) demand for goods k 6= j does not increase.
Assumption 2 (weak substitutes). j (x) is weakly decreasing in xk for all j 2 J ,
k =2 f0; jg.
We make three comments on this restriction. First, in a discrete choice model it is implied
by the standard assumptions that xj is excluded from the conditional indirect utilities of
goods k 6= j and that the conditional indirect utility of good j is increasing in xj.
Second, although Assumption 2 appears to rule out complements, it does not. In the
case of indivisible goods, demand can be characterized as arising from a discrete choice
model in which every bundle is a distinct choice (e.g., Gentzkow (2004)). As already noted,
the weak substitutes condition is mild in a discrete choice demand system. In the case of
divisible goods, the fact that  may be any transformation of the demand system enables
Assumption 2 to admit some models of complements, including some with arbitrarily strong
complementarity. Example 1 below illustrates.
Finally, consider the relation of this assumption to a requirement of strict gross substi-
tutes. If good zero is a real good, then our weak substitutes condition is weaker, corre-
sponding to the usual notion of weak gross substitutes. When good 0 is an articial good,
Assumption 2 strengthens the weak gross substitutes condition in a natural way: taking the
case where x is (minus) price, all else equal, a fall in the price of some good j > 0 cannot
cause the total demand (over all goods) to fall.
To state the second condition characterizing connected substitutes, we rst dene a
directional notion of (strict) substitution.
Denition 1. Good j substitutes to good k at x if k (x) is strictly decreasing in xj.
Consider a decline in xj with all else held xed. By Assumption 2 this weakly raises
k (x) for all k 6= j. The goods to which j substitutes are those whose demands k (x)
9
strictly rise. When xj is (minus) the price of good j, this is a standard notion. Denition 1
merely extends this notion to other demand shifters that may play the role of x. Although
this is a directional notion, in most examples it is symmetric; i.e., j substitutes to k i¤ k
substitutes to j.6 An exception is substitution to good 0: since any demand shifters for
good 0 are held xed, Denition 1 does not dene substitution from good 0 to other goods.7
It will be useful to represent substitution among the goods with the directed graph of a
matrix  (x) whose elements are
j+1;k+1 =
8<: 1 fgood j substitutes to good k at xg j > 00 j = 0:
The directed graph of  (x) has nodes (vertices) representing each good and a directed edge
from node k to node ` whenever good k substitutes to good ` at x.
Assumption 3 (connected strict substitution). For all x 2 X , the directed graph of
 (x) has, from every node k 6= 0, a directed path to node 0.
Figure 1 illustrates the directed graphs of  (x) at generic x 2 ~X for some standard
models of di¤erentiated products, letting  x be the price vector and assuming (as usual)
that each conditional indirect utility is strictly decreasing in price. The connected substitutes
conditions hold for X   ~X in all of these models. As panel e illustrates, they hold even
when J is comprised of independent goods and either an outside good or an articial good
0. Each of these examples has an extension to models of discrete/continuous demand (e.g.,
Novshek and Sonnenschein (1979), Hanemann (1984), Dubin and McFadden (1984)), models
of multiple discrete choice (e.g., Hendel (1999), Dube (2004)), and models of di¤erentiated
products demand (e.g., Deneckere and Rothschild (1992), Perlo¤ and Salop (1985)) that
6See, e.g., Appendix D. We emphasize that this refers to symmetry of the binary notion of substitution
dened above, not to symmetry of any magnitudes.
7If good 0 is a real good designated to normalize utilities or prices, one can imagine expanding x to
include x0 and dening substitution from good 0 to other goods prior to the normalization that xes x0. If
Assumption 3 holds under the original designation of good 0, it will hold for all designations of good 0 as
long as substitution (using the expanded vector x = (x0; : : : xJ)) is symmetric at all x 2 .
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Figure 1: Directed graphs of  (x) for x 2 ~X (x equals minus price) in some standard models
of di¤erentiated products. Panel a: multinomial logit, multinomial probit, mixed logit, etc.;
Panel b: models of pure vertical di¤erentiation, (e.g., Mussa and Rosen (1978), Bresnahan
(1981b), etc.); Panel c: Salop (1979) with random utility for the outside good; Panel d:
Rochet and Stole (2002); Panel e: independent goods with either an outside good or an
articial good 0.
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provide a foundation for representative consumer models of monopolistic competition (e.g.,
Spence (1976), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)).8 Note that only the models represented in panel
a satisfy strict gross substitutes.
As we have noted already, allowing complementarity is straightforward with indivisible
goods. Further, natural restrictions such as additive or subadditive bundle pricing would
only help ensure invertibility by restricting the set X .9 The following example shows that
complements can be accommodated even in some models of demand for divisible goods.
Example 1 (Demand for Divisible Complements). Let qj(p) : R+ ! R+ denote a
di¤erentiable function giving the quantity of good j demanded at price vector p (here x =  p).
Let q0 (p) = q0 be a small positive constant and dene Q (p) 
PJ
j=0 qj (p). Let jk (p) denote
the elasticity of demand for good j with respect to pk and let Qk (p) denote that of Q (p) with
respect to pk. If we assume that for all p such that qj (p) > 0, (i) Q (p) is strictly decreasing
in pj 8j  1, and (ii) jk (p)  Qk (p) 8k; j 6= k, then it is easily conrmed that the connected




(see Appendix B). A simple example is the constant elasticity demand




k with  >  > 0. For for su¢ ciently small q0
and any X  such that all qj are bounded above zero, conditions (i) and (ii) above are easily
conrmed (see Appendix B).
The following lemma provides a useful reinterpretation of Assumption 3.
Lemma 1. Assumption 3 holds i¤ for all x 2 X  and any nonempty K  f1; : : : ; Jg, there
exist k 2 K and ` =2 K such that ` (x) is strictly decreasing in xk.
8Mosenson and Dror (1972) used a graphical representation to characterize the possible patterns of sub-
stitution for Hicksian demand. Suppose x is minus the price vector, expanded to include the price of
good zero (see footnote 7). Suppose further that  is di¤erentiable and represents the Hicksian (compen-
sated) demand of an individual consumer. Let + (x) be the expanded subsitution matrix, with elements
+j+1;k+1 = 1 fgood j substitutes to good k at xg : Mosenson and Dror (1972) show that the directed graph
of + (x) must be strongly connected. This is a su¢ cient condition for Assumption 3.
9In a recent working paper, Azevedo, White, and Weyl (forthcoming) consider an exchange economy with
indivisible goods and a continuum of nancially unconstrained consumers with quasilinear utilities. They
focus on existence of Walrasian equilibrium prices but also consider uniqueness under a restriction to additive
pricing of the elementary goods in each bundle. Their large supportassumption on preferences makes all
bundles strict gross substitutes in the aggregate demand function. See the related discussion in section 2.
12
Proof. (necessity of Assumption 3) Let I0 (x)  J be comprised of 0 and the indexes of all
other goods whose nodes have a directed path to node 0 in the directed graph of  (x). If
Assumption 3 fails, then for some x 2 X  the set K = J nI0 (x) is nonempty. Further, by
construction there is no directed path from any node in K to any node in I0 (x). Thus,
there do not exist k 2 K and ` =2 K such that ` (x) is strictly decreasing in xk:
(su¢ ciency) Assumption 3 implies that for all x 2 X  and any nonempty K  J n0, every
node k0 2 K has a directed path in  (x) to node 0 =2 K. By denition, on this directed
path there exists some k 2 K (possibly k = k0) and ` =2 K (possibly ` = 0) such that good k
substitutes to good `. 
Thus, Assumption 3 requires that there be no strict subset of goods that substitute only
among themselves. Note that when good 0 is an articial good, its presence in J weakens
the requirements of Assumption 3: taking the case where x is (minus) price, when the price
of some good j > 0 falls it may be only the demand for good zero that strictly declines.
Finally, when introducing the model we suggested that xj should be thought of as a
monotonic shifter of demand for good j. The following remark shows that we have implicitly
imposed this monotonicity with the connected substitutes conditions.
Remark 1. Suppose Assumptions 2 and 3 hold. Then for all x 2 X  and j > 0, j (x) is
strictly increasing in xj:
Proof. Take x 2 X  and x0 2 X such that x0j > xj; x0k = xk 8k 6= j. Assumption 2 implies
k (x
0)  k (x) 8k 6= j: Further, by Lemma 1, ` (x0) < ` (x) for some ` 6= j. Thus,P
k 6=j ` (x
0) <
P
k 6=j ` (x). The claim then follows from (2). 
5 Invertibility of Demand
To establish our main result, we begin with two lemmas. The rst shows that under weak
substitutes, if xj weakly increases for (only) a subset of goods j, demand for the remaining
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goods (taken as a whole) does not increase.10 Adding the requirement of connected strict
substitution, Lemma 3 then shows that, all else equal, a strict increase in xj for some goods
j strictly raises demand for those goods (taken as a whole). This intuitive property is the
key to our injectivity result.
Lemma 2. Given Assumption 1, Assumption 2 implies that for any I  J and any x; x0 2 X






Proof. Let ~x be such that, for all j 6= 0, ~xj = xj if j 2 I and ~xj = x0j if j =2 I. If J nI







trivially. If instead J nI contains any nonzero element, without loss let these be 1; : : : ; n.
Then let ~x(0) = x, r = 0, and consider the following iterative argument. Add one to r and,
for all j > 0, let ~x(r)j = ~x
(r 1)




























and the result follows. 
Lemma 3. Let Assumptions 13 hold. Then for all x; x0 2 X  such that I 








j2I j (x) :
Proof. Since 0 =2 I, Lemma 1 ensures that for some k 2 I and some ` =2 I, ` (x) is
strictly decreasing in xk. Take one such pair (k; `). Dene a point ~x by ~xj = xj +
10The converse also holds: taking x0j  xj , x0i = xi 8i 6= j; and I = J n fkg, we obtain k (x) weakly
decreasing in xj .
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(x0k   xk) 1 fj = kg 8j > 0. Assumption 1 ensures that  is dened at ~x. By Assumption 2,









j =2I j (x
0) 
P











and the result follows from (2).11 
To demonstrate invertibility of demand under the connected substitutes conditions, we
will rst show that  is inverse isotone on X . Below we use  to denote the component-wise
weak partial order on Rn. Thus for y; y0 2 Rn, y  y0 i¤ yi  y0i for all i = 1; : : : ; n:
Denition 2. A mapping F : D  Rn ! Rm is inverse isotone if for any y; y0 2 D,
F (y0)  F (y) implies y0  y:
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 13,  is inverse isotone on X .
Proof. Take any x; x0 2 X  such that
 (x0)   (x) (4)
and suppose, contrary to the claim, that the set I =

j : x0j > xj
	
is non-empty. By Lemma







which contradicts (4). 
11If X  is open then, given Assumption 2, Assumption 3 is necessary for the conclusion of this lemma.
Suppose Assumption 3 fails. Then by Assumption 2 and Lemma 1 there is some x 2  and some nonempty
K  J n0, such that ` (x) is constant in xk for all k 2 K and all ` =2 K. For some  > 0 and each k 2 K
let x0k = xk + , while x
0
j = xj for j =2 K. Now I = K. For su¢ ciently small  we have x0 2 X  andP
j =2I j (x
0) =
P







Injectivity follows from Theorem 1, exploiting the following well known observation (e.g.,
Rheinboldt (1970b)).12
Remark 2. If F : D  Rn ! Rm is inverse isotone, it is injective.
Proof. Suppose F (y) = F (y0) for y; y0 2 D. Since F is inverse isotone this implies both
y  y0 and y0  y; hence y0 = y: 
This gives us our main result:
Corollary 1. Under Assumptions 13,  is injective on X .
6 Discussion
Given the new set of su¢ cient conditions for invertibility provided by Corollary 1, two
questions naturally arise. One is whether these conditions are unnecessarily strong. Another
is how these conditions relate to those required by the classic results of Gale and Nikaido
(1965) and Hadamard (1906a, 1906b). In this section we provide partial answers to these
questions and develop some additional results of independent interest. To facilitate this, we
assume  is di¤erentiable on X . In addition, consider the following di¤erentiable version
of the connected strict substitution requirement in Assumption 3 (recall Lemma 1).
Assumption 3. For all x 2 X  and any nonempty K  f1; : : : ; Jg, there exist k 2 K and
` =2 K such that @`(x)
@xk
< 0:
Given di¤erentiability, this condition slightly strengthens Assumption 3 by ruling out a
zero derivative @`(x)
@xk











: : : @J (x)
@xJ
37775 :
12Another application of Theorem 1 appears in a recent paper by Gandhi, Lu, and Shi (2011). They
exploit the inverse isotone property shown here in studying identication and estimation of multinomial
choice demand models under mismeasurement of market shares.
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Theorem 2. Suppose Assumption 2 holds and that  (x) is di¤erentiable on X . Then the
following conditions are equivalent:
(i) J (x) is nonsingular on X ;
(ii) J (x) is a P -matrix on X ;
(iii) Assumption 3*.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
This result leads to several valuable observations:
Near Necessity. Equivalence between conditions (i) and (iii) suggests that our su¢ cient
conditions for invertibility are not much too strong. Given weak substitutes and di¤erentia-
bility, Assumption 3* (slightly stronger than Assumption 3) is necessary for a nonsingular
Jacobian. Thus, given the restriction to demand systems that can be transformed to satisfy
weak substitutes, connected substitutes may be viewed as nearly necessaryfor even local
invertibility.
Relation to Gale-Nikaido. The equivalence between conditions (ii) and (iii) provides a
tight link between connected substitutes and the P -matrix condition required by the classic
result of Gale and Nikaido (1965).13 Given di¤erentiability and weak substitutes, Gale and
Nikaidos P -matrix requirement is equivalent to a slightly strengthened version of our As-
sumption 3. One would never use this observation to establish invertibility: if the connected
substitutes conditions hold, Corollary 1 establishes invertibility without the additional dif-
ferentiability and domain restrictions Gale and Nikaido relied on. However, Theorem 2
claries the relationship between the two results.14 One interpretation is that we drop Gale
and Nikaidos di¤erentiability requirement, replace the restriction to rectangular X  with
13Recall that, given di¤erentiability and a nonsingular Jacobian J (x) on a rectangular domain X , they
required further that J (x) be a P -matrix on X :
14A secondary result (Theorem 5) in Gale and Nikaido (1965) shows that their injectivity result can be
extended to show inverse isotonicity under the additional restriction that J (x) has only nonpositive o¤-
diagonal entries. Our weak substitutes assumption strengthens their restriction on the o¤-diagonals only
by requiring 0 (x) to be nonincreasing in each xj . This allows us to avoid their problematic requirement
of a rectangular domain and implies that their P -matrix requirement would add nothing to the requirement
of nonsingular Jacobian.
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the weak substitutes condition, and replace the P -matrix requirement with the more eas-
ily interpreted but essentially equivalent (slightly weaker) requirement of connected strict
substitution.
AGlobal Inverse Function Theorem. One corollary to our two theorems is the following
global inverse function theorem for a mapping with arbitrary open domain.
Corollary 2. Let  : RJ ! RJ be a C1 function and suppose that, given (2), Assumption 2
holds. Then for any open X   RJ , the restriction of  to X  has a C1 inverse on  (X )
i¤ J (x) is nonsingular on X .
Proof. Necessity of a nonsingular Jacobian for existence of a di¤erentiable inverse follows
from the identity  1 ( (x)) = x and the chain rule. To show su¢ ciency, observe that
by Theorem 2 a nonsingular Jacobian on X  implies that Assumption 3* holds. Thus the
restriction of  to X  is inverse isotone by Theorem 1, implying that  has an inverse on
 (X ). By the standard inverse function theorem this inverse is C1 in a neighborhood of
every point in  (X ) and, thus, C1 on  (X ). 
This result shows that if weak substitutes holds, the conclusion of the usual (local)
inverse function theorem extends to any open subset of the domain. This follows from the
equivalence between conditions (i) and (iii) in Theorem 2.
Corollary 2 may be compared to the classic result of Hadamard (and its extensions), which
shows that if both X  and S are smooth connected manifolds and S is simply connected,
a C1 map  : X  ! S is a di¤eomorphism (i.e., a smooth bijection) if and only if it has
nonzero Jacobian onX  and is proper.15 Corollary 2 avoids any connectedness condition on
the domain or range and replaces properness with the weak substitutes condition. Whereas
properness is not easily veried, we have shown that weak substitutes is a natural property of
many demand systems. Finally, our Assumption 3* provides a widely applicable condition
equivalent (given weak substitutes) to Hadamards requirement of local invertibility. Of
course, our main result (Corollary 1) requires neither smoothness nor open domain.
15See e.g., Palais (1959), Ho (1975), Parthasarathy (1983), Parthasarathy and Ravindran (2003), and
Krantz and Parks (2002). A function is proper if the pre-image of any compact set is compact.
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Unlike Hadamards theorem, Corollary 2 avoids the question of surjectivity (and the
additional requirements this creates) by seeking a smooth inverse only on  (X ). Rhein-
boldt (1970a) provides necessary and su¢ cient conditions for surjectivity onto RJ for inverse
isotone functions.
Transforming Demand. As noted already, if f (x) describes a demand system that does
not itself satisfy the connected substitutes conditions, it may be possible to nd a function g
such that  = g f does. Theorem 2 provides some guidance on suitable transformations g.
If both f and g have nonsingular Jacobians a requirement one might not expect to avoid
in seeking to show invertibility of a di¤erentiable demand system then by the equivalence
of conditions (i) and (iii) it is su¢ cient to verify that g  f satises weak substitutes.
Identication and Estimation in Di¤erentiated Products Markets. The su¢ ciency
of condition (iii) for conditions (i) and (ii) in Theorem 2 is important to the econometric
theory underlying standard empirical models of di¤erentiated products markets (e.g., Berry,
Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995)). Berry and Haile (2010a) use the latter implication to establish
nonparametric identiability of rmsmarginal costs and to testability of alternative models
of oligopoly competition. There the P -matrix property ensures invertibility of the derivative
matrix of market shares with respect to prices for goods produced by the same rm a matrix
appearing in the rst-order conditions characterizing equilibrium behavior. Their results
generalize immediately to models with continuous demand satisfying connected substitutes.
Berry, Linton, and Pakes (2004) provide the asymptotic distribution theory for a class of
estimators for discrete choice demand models. A key condition, conrmed there for special
cases, is that the Jacobian of the demand system (with respect to a vector of demand shocks)
is full rank on X . Su¢ ciency of the connected substitutes conditions again establishes
economically interpretable su¢ cient conditions with wide applicability.
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7 Conclusion
We have introduced the notion of connected substitutes and shown that this structure is
su¢ cient for invertibility of a nonparametric nonseparable demand system. The connected
substitutes conditions are satised in a wide range of models used in practice, including many
with complementary goods. These conditions have transparent economic interpretation,
are easily checked in practice, and allow demonstration of invertibility without functional
form restrictions, smoothness assumptions, or strong domain restrictions commonly relied
on previously. Further, given a restriction to weak substitutes, our su¢ cient conditions are
also nearly necessaryfor even local invertibility.
Appendices
A Proof of Theorem 2
We rst review some denitions (see, e.g., Horn and Johnson (1990)). A square matrix is
reducible if it can be placed in block upper triangular form by simultaneous permutations of
rows and columns. A square matrix that is not reducible is irreducible. A square matrix A





If the inequality is strict for all j, A is said to be strictly diagonally dominant. An irreducibly
diagonally dominant matrix is a square matrix that is irreducible and weakly diagonally
dominant, with at least one diagonal being strictly dominant, i.e., with at least one column







We begin with three lemmas concerning square matrices. The rst is well known (see,
e.g., Taussky (1949) or Horn and Johnson (1990), p. 363) and the third is a variation on a
well known result. The second appears to be new.
Lemma 4. An irreducibly diagonally dominant matrix is nonsingular.
Lemma 5. Let D be a square matrix with nonzero diagonal entries and suppose that every
principal submatrix of D is weakly diagonally dominant, with at least one strictly dominant
diagonal. Then D is nonsingular.
Proof. LetM = D and consider the following iterative argument. IfM is 11; nonsingularity
is immediate from the nonzero diagonal. For M of higher dimension, if M is irreducible the
result follows from Lemma 4. Otherwise M is reducible, so by simultaneous permutation of
rows and columns, it can be placed in block upper triangular form; i.e., for some permutation
matrix P ,




where A and C are square matrices. Simultaneous permutation of rows and columns changes
neither the set of diagonal entries nor the o¤-diagonal entries appearing in the same column
(or row) as a given diagonal entry. Each principal submatrix of A or of C is also a principal
submatrix of D. Thus, A and C have only nonzero diagonal entries and are such that every
principal submatrix is diagonally dominant with at least one strictly dominant diagonal. M
is nonsingular if M is, so it is su¢ cient to show that both A and C are nonsingular. Let
M = A and restart the iterative argument. This will show A to be nonsingular, possibly
after further iteration. Repeating for M = C completes the proof. 
Lemma 6. Suppose a real square matrix D is weakly diagonally dominant with strictly
positive diagonal elements. Then jDj  0.
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Proof. Let Dij denote the elements of D. For  2 [0; 1] dene a matrix D () by
Dij () =
8<: Dij i = jDij i 6= j:
For  < 1, D () is strictly diagonally dominant. Since the diagonal elements of D () are
strictly positive this implies jD ()j > 0 (see, e.g., Theorem 4 in Taussky (1949)). Since
jD ()j is continuous in  and jD (1)j = jDj, the result follows. 
Two observations regarding the demand system  will be useful.
Remark 3. Suppose  is di¤erentiable on X  and that Assumptions 2 and 3* hold. Then
@j(x)
@xj
> 0 for all j > 0 and x 2 X :
Proof. Di¤erentiate (2) with respect to xj and applying Assumptions 2 and 3*. 
Lemma 7. Suppose  is di¤erentiable on X  and that Assumptions 2 and 3* hold. Then
for all x 2 X , every principal submatrix of J (x) is weakly diagonally dominant, with at
least one strictly dominant diagonal.
Proof. Take x 2 X  and nonemptyK  f1; 2; : : : ; Jg. LetDK(x) denote the principal subma-
trix of J (x) obtained by deleting rows r =2 K and columns c =2 K. Because
P






By Remark 3 and Assumption 2, @j(x)
@xj
> 0 and @k(x)
@xj















Furthermore, since 0 =2 K, Assumption 3* implies that for some j 2 K the second sum in
(A.2) is strictly positive. For that j the inequality (A.3) must be strict. 
With these results in place, we now prove the su¢ ciency of condition (iii) in Theorem 2
for condition (ii). This will immediately imply su¢ ciency for condition (i). Take arbitrary
x 2 X  and let D (x) be a principal submatrix of J (x). Since every principal submatrix of
D (x) is also a principal submatrix of J (x), Lemma 7 implies that every principal submatrix
of D (x) is weakly diagonally dominant with at least one strictly dominant diagonal. Thus,
by Lemma 5, D (x) is nonsingular. Since, by Remark 3, D (x) also has strictly positive
diagonal entries, it follows from nonsingularity and Lemma 6 that jD (x)j > 0.
Finally, we show necessity of condition (iii) in Theorem 2 for condition (i). This will
immediately imply necessity for condition (ii). Suppose condition (iii) fails. Then by As-
sumption 2, for some x 2 X  there is a nonempty set K  f1; : : : ; Jg such that @j(x)
@xk
= 0
for all k 2 K and all j 2 J nK. Fix this value of x and, without loss, permute the labels of




where A is jKj  jKj. If instead jKj = J , let A = J (x). Because 0 =2 K, @0(x)@xk is zero for




= 0 8k 2 K.
Thus, either jKj = 1 and A = @1(x)
@x1







8k 2 K. In either case,
A is singular and the result follows.
B Demand for Divisible Complements
Here we demonstrate two assertions made in the discussion of Example 1 in the text.
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Proposition 1. Let q0 (p) = q0 be a small positive constant and dene Q (p) =
PJ
j=0 qj (p).
Suppose that for all p such that qj (p) > 0, (i) Q (p) is strictly decreasing in pj 8j  1 and
(ii) jk (p)  Qk (p) 8k; j 6= k. Then Assumptions 2 and 3 hold for any X   ~X under the




















  qj (p) @Q(p)@pk
i













implies that each good j 6= 0 substitutes directly to the articial good zero on ~X . 
Proposition 2. For p such that qk (p)   > 0 for all k > 0, the hypotheses of Proposition 1




k with  >  > 0.
Proof. Part (i) of the hypotheses is immediate since all real goods have downward sloping
demand and are strict gross complements. Since Qk (p) =
PJ
j=1 j (p) jk (p), part (ii)
holds if
     [1  k (p)  0 (p)]    k (p)
i.e.,
  qk (p)
qk (p) + q0
:
Since qk (p)   > 0 and  < , this holds for su¢ ciently small q0. 
C A Lancasterian Example
Consider a simple variation of Lancasters (1966) diet example, illustrating a continuous
demand system with only local substitution, with a non-rectangular domain of interest, and
where the introduction of an articial good 0 is useful even though an outside good is already
modeled. A representative consumer has a budget y and chooses consumption quantities
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(q1; q2; q3) of three goods: wine, bread, and cheese, respectively. Her preferences are given
by a utility function
u (q1; q2; q3) = ln(z1) + ln (z2) + ln (z3) +m
where (z1; z2; z3) are consumption of calories, protein, and calcium, and m is money left to
spend on other goods. The mapping of goods consumed to characteristics consumed is given
by17
z1 = q1 + q2 + q3
z2 = q2 + q3
z3 = q3:
We assume y > 3. The set of prices (p1; p2; p3) such that all goods are purchased is dened
by
0 < p1 < p2   p1 < p3   p2: (C.1)
Since p plays the role of x here, (C.1) denes ~X , which is not a rectangle. Let X = ~X .















for p 2 X . These equations fully characterize demand for all goods. However, we introduce
17Unlike Lancaster (1966), we sacrice accuracy of nutritional information for the sake of simplicity.
25





Observe that this articial good is not the outside goodm. Further, the connected substitutes
conditions would not hold if the outside good were treated as good 0:
With (C.2), (C.3) implies




From these equations, it is now easily conrmed that Assumption 2 holds Further, goods 2
and 3 strictly substitute to each other, goods 1 and 2 strictly substitute to each other, and
good 1 strictly substitutes to good 0. Thus, Assumption 3 also holds.
D Symmetric Strict Substitution
Our graphical illustrations of the connected substitutes property involved examples in which
(strict) substitution is symmetric, i.e., good j substitutes to good k only if good k also
substitutes to good j (excepting substitution from good 0, as discussed in the text). The
following result shows that this generically true in discrete choice models given monotonicity
in xj.
Proposition 3. Consider a discrete choice model in which each consumer is conditional
indirect utility from good j is vij = vj (xj; i), j = 1; : : : ; J . Suppose the (possibly innite-
dimensional) parameter i is independent of x and that vj (; i) is strictly increasing for all
i. Then for all j 2 f1; : : : ; Jg ; k 2 f1; : : : ; Jg nj, and almost all x, k (x) strictly decreasing
in xj implies j (x) is strictly decreasing in xk.
Proof. Strict monotonicity implies that for all i, vj (; i) and vk (; i) are almost everywhere
continuous. Take a point of continuity x. By the exclusion of xj from vk () for k 6= j, to
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have k (x) strictly decreasing in xj requires that for all  > 0
Pr






This implies that j (x) is strictly decreasing in x. 
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